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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The public sector has been going through considerable reforms recently.
Privatization is one of the ways to potentially provide stronger incentives.
The focus of this paper is on the question whether competition between pri-
vate and public suppliers could ever provide better incentives than complete
privatization.
This paper has been written with education sector in mind but it can
apply to other welfare services as well. One of the main features of welfare
services is that ￿nal output (educational value added) is nonveri￿able and
therefore providing incentives by simple contracts is not easy. Although qual-
ity is nonveri￿able it is observable. People have an idea of which schools are
good although contracts on quality cannot be enforced by courts. As quality
is observable the higher-quality service providers attract more customers and
competition can provide incentives.
The second important feature of welfare services is that they are provided
by professionals (teachers) who are not purely motivated by money. These
professionals are either internally motivated and get job satisfaction from
providing a good quality service ￿ or externally motivated and being asso-
ciated with a high-quality institution is good for their career concerns. We
can model this motivation by private bene￿ts the professionals derive from
the quality of the service.
The customers (students) are of diﬀerent types. Some students are hard
to educate while others need to have continuous intellectual challenges to
remain motivated. Diﬀerent types of students therefore need diﬀerent services
and teachers￿ eﬀorts. Further, diﬀerent types of students give diﬀerent levels
of private bene￿ts to the teachers one type being more rewarding than the
other. There are two types of students: rewarding (or low-cost) and ordinary
(or high-cost). We assume that the type of the customer is observable to
teachers but not veri￿able.
Including these main features of the welfare services we compare full pri-
vatization to a mix of a private and a public supplier. We ￿nd that the sup-
pliers specialize. Each supplier concentrates on serving one customer type
and can therefore tailor their service for the needs of that type and provide
￿rst-best quality. The suppliers can soften the competition by specialization
rather than competing head to head for both types of customers.
Under privatization the suppliers￿ pro￿ts have to be equal although they
are providing diﬀerent quality levels to diﬀerent customers. Otherwise the
2specialization equilibrium does not exist. The equal pro￿ts requirement im-
plies that we can only solve for the price diﬀerence in the equilibrium. The
supplier serving the rewarding type charges a higher price because they are
providing higher quality and hence higher cost service. Under privatization
the prices are likely to escalate to the highest level and the consumer surplus
is low.
In the mixed institution the government sets the public fee so low that
the public supplier can only serve the ordinary type. This leaves the private
s u p p l i e rf r e et oc o n c e n t r a t eo nt h er e w a r d i n gt y p e .T h ef e et h ep r i v a t es u p -
plier can charge is limited by the competition from the public supplier and
accordingly the private fee remains relatively low.
The strength of the mixed institution is that the low public fee set by the
government anchors the private supplier￿s fee also relatively low while under
privatization the fees are likely to escalate. That is why the mixed institution
maximizes consumer surplus when the proportion of ordinary types is high.
While when the rewarding type has a large majority, privatization is optimal.
The equal pro￿t requirement constrains the price for the majority type so
much that it is lower than the relatively low price under mixed institution.
Although the ordinary type is always better oﬀ in the mixed institution,
their share is so small that the aggregate consumer welfare is maximized
under privatization.
We also analyze mixed institution when a proportion of the population
cannot opt out from the public sector because of wealth constraints. We ￿nd
that a service trap emerges and the public supplier provides minimal service
to all its customers. Vouchers to poor customers enable the poor customers
to have a choice and restore the merits of the mixed institution.
We build on Halonen and Propper (1999) who analyze quasimarket re-
forms for welfare services and compare competition between public suppliers
to a single public agency. In this paper we include private suppliers in the
framework. Related literature on privatization and incomplete contracts are
among others Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Hart et al. (1997) and Hart (2003).
None of these papers analyzes the mixed structure where public and private
suppliers coexist.
Epple and Romano (1998) (ER) also analyse competition between private
and public schools and obtain specialization of schools in diﬀerent ability
types. Our paper is complementary to theirs as we analyse quite a diﬀerent
environment. We focus on incentive problems while in ER the school￿s quality
depends on the mean ability of the students and the costs depend on the
3number of the students (neither depend on the supplier￿s eﬀort). Public
sector is a passive player in ER while in our paper both public and private
suppliers are strategic. ER take the mixed structure as given while our
focus is on optimal institutional design. In ER student types are completely
veri￿able and what drives the results is price discrimination between diﬀerent
types of students. Our paper analyzes the other extreme where student types
are not at all veri￿able. The real world lies between these two extremes.
In many countries, most notably in the UK and US, both private and
public suppliers are present in the education sector. Our paper suggests
an economic rationale for the coexistence of privately and publicly owned
providers of education services.
Our paper belongs to a rapidly growing literature on the optimal orga-
nization of the provision of collective goods when agents are motivated by
non-pecuniary aspects of motivation (see Akerlof and Kranton (2003), BØn-
abou and Tirole (2003), Francois (2000), Murdock (2002) and Besley and
Ghatak (2005)). Our paper emphasizes that specialization among compet-
ing suppliers can accommodate diﬀerent non-pecuniary bene￿ts from serving
customers. While optimal specialization is possible under full privatization
and under a mixed institution, the latter avoids price escalation and tends
t oy i e l dh i g h e rc o n s u m e rw e l f a r e .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
model. Section 3 derives the ￿rst-best solution. Section 4 analyzes priva-
tization while Section 5 examines competition between public and private
suppliers. Section 6 determines the optimal institution. Wealth constraints
are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
There are two suppliers (schools), indexed by i =1 ,2, each run by a manager,
Mi. The customers (students) of the suppliers are of two types, A and B.
Proportion γA of the population are of type A and proportion γB =
¡
1 − γA¢
are of type B. We assume that the type of the customer is observable to Mi
but is not veri￿able.
The value of the supplier￿s service to the customers, vA
i and vB
i , depends




i ≥ 0,j= A,B).1
1It is by no means obvious or necessary that the value of a unit of eﬀort is the same for



















We assume that the type-speci￿c quality of the service vA
i and vB
i is observ-
able to the customers but is not veri￿able. There are many aspects of school
quality that are diﬃcult to verify but are not diﬃcult to observe. Customers
have a clear idea of which schools are good but contracts on quality cannot
be enforced by courts.
Eﬀort creates a disutility ceA
i and ceB
i per customer of each type to Mi
where c>0.2 The managers of the suppliers are risk neutral. Moreover, they
derive some private bene￿t per customer, denoted by b, from their work.
They are either internally motivated and get job satisfaction from providing
a good quality service ￿ or externally motivated and get more respect when















with µA,µ B ≥ 0. We assume that one activity is more rewarding than the
other. In particular, we assume that µB >µ A. One interpretation is that
type B are the bright students. Mi either enjoys serving type B more or high
value service for type B is more important for career concerns. Hence, the
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where cA and cB are the net costs per unit of eﬀort of each task. Note that
our assumption implies cA = c−µA >c B = c−µB. Type B is referred to as
the rewarding type and type A as the ordinary type.
We assume cA < 1. Otherwise marginal costs of providing the service to
the high-cost customers would be higher than the marginal value for any
By suitable renormalization we can translate value diﬀerences into cost diﬀerences if value
diﬀerences can be captured by a scale parameter.
2Strictly speaking, ceA
i and ceB
i are cost densities since we are working with a continuum
of customers. To reduce unnecessary language we will drop the density term in the whole
paper.
5positive level of eﬀort. We also assume that µB <cso that the costs are
positive. It will be essential for our results that cA and cB diﬀer. We will
develop the precise condition on the cost diﬀerence over the course of the
paper.
We apply the Hotelling model in which the suppliers are located at the
extremes of the unit interval [0,1]. Supplier 1 is located at 0 and supplier
2 at 1. Each supplier has a capacity of 1. The customers of each type
are uniformly distributed on the unit interval with density 1. They incur
a transportation cost t per unit of length. The distance can be interpreted
literally as a geographical distance between two schools. The market shares
of the suppliers are denoted by sA
i and sB





The regulator designs the institution. We analyze two institutions. Ei-
ther both suppliers are private or we have a mixed structure where one sup-
plier is private and the other is public. The regulator is assumed to be
benevolent.
If the suppliers are privatized, they are free to choose prices, denoted by
p1 and p2, to their customers. In this private institution neither suppliers nor
customers receive public funds.
The second option is that the regulator chooses a mixed structure with
one public and one private supplier. Then the regulator pays the public
supplier 1 a fee f1 p e rc u s t o m e ra n da￿xed wage w to the manager if the
fees are not suﬃcient to motivate the manager to run the organization. Fees
are ￿nanced by lump sum taxes. The private supplier 2 is free to charge a
price p2 to customers. The private supplier does not receive any public funds.
Neither do the customers of the private supplier.
The third option is that both suppliers are public. We do not examine
this third option in detail but we will comment on it in the last section.
In our model, the customer￿s type is not veri￿able and hence the suppli-
ers charge the same price/fee for both types.3 We assume that the regulator
3If there were price discrimination between the types, the supplier would always claim
the customer to be of the more expensive type, since the type cannot be veri￿ed.
There are legal limits to price discrimination even if the types are veri￿able as the
Amazon case demonstrates. Uniform pricing may also result from political concerns. We
can argue that the poor customers are the high-cost ones. Then price discrimination would
result in higher fees for the poor. This may not be politically feasible.
Epple and Romano (1998) analyze competition between private and public schools when
the student ability types are completely veri￿able. Price discrimination does all the work
in their model. We can view our paper as exploring the other extreme: types are not at
all veri￿able. The real world lies between these two extreme cases.
6maximizes the overall sum of the utility of customers by choosing an appro-
priate institution and fee levels if a supplier is public.
The timing of the model is given as follows. First, the regulator chooses
the institution. Second, under the mixed structure the regulator chooses the
fee for the public supplier. Third, the rest of the decisions are made simul-
taneously: the managers choose the eﬀorts and the prices and the customers
choose their supplier.
3F i r s t - b e s t s o l u t i o n
In this section we derive the ￿rst-best solution under the assumption that the
regulator can verify the quality of the service. The regulator is assumed to
maximize the aggregate welfare of the customers in the sense of a utalitarian
welfare function under the condition that the regulator needs to motivate the
manager to participate. We assume that the manager can earn zero wages
outside. It is obvious that the ￿rst-best solution implies equal eﬀort levels














2 for i =1 ,2,j= A,B
¢
because travelling costs
are minimized in this case. Then the regulator￿s problem of maximizing
































. Aggregate welfare is de￿ned as
the sum of the customers￿ valuation of the services minus transportation costs
and wages paid for the managers. The term 1
4t is the average transportation
cost. The manager￿s participation constraint is binding and therefore the
￿rst-order conditions are given by:
1
eA +1
− cA =0 (1)
1
eB +1
− cB =0 (2)
7From equations (1) and (2) we obtain the ￿rst-best solutions denoted by eA∗
and eB∗.










γA(1 − cA)+γB(1 − cB)
·
.







for each type of customer. Suppose that task A
is much less rewarding than task B (cA >> cB). Then the ￿rst-best solution
also requires eA∗ << eB∗. The ￿rst-best solution does not only depend on the
production costs but also on the private bene￿ts of the managers. If task A
is not rewarding in the sense of private bene￿ts, the manager has to be com-
pensated by higher monetary wage to undertake this eﬀort. This increases
the regulator￿s marginal cost for type A and therefore a lower quality level
f o rt h i st y p ei si m p l e m e n t e d .
The ￿rst-best solution in both cases shows that the optimal eﬀort and
quality levels for one type are independent of the optimal level for the other
type. The optimal eﬀort level eA∗ only depends on the marginal costs cA.
This is because both the values and the costs are separable across types.
In what follows we examine alternative institutions when quality levels are
observable but not veri￿able. Because of unveri￿ability contracts on quality
cannot be written. But because quality is observable, competition between
the suppliers can provide incentives to increase service quality in order to
attract more customers.
4 Competition between private suppliers
We start by analyzing competition between private suppliers. The industry is
fully privatized: the suppliers are private and the service is funded privately.
The customers pay the fees themselves and do not receive subsidies from the
government.
The managers maximize supplier pro￿ts taking their own eﬀort costs into
































j + t + pj − pi
2t
for i,j =1 ,2,i 6= j, k = A,B
The demand functions are given by the Hotelling model. Customer of type A











, taking into account the transportation
costs.




























































Higher eﬀort for type A increases the value of the service for type A and the
market share accordingly. This marginal bene￿ti st h e￿rst term in equation
(3) while the second term gives the marginal cost: higher eﬀort is exerted
for all the type A customers served by this supplier. Equation (5) is the
￿rst-order condition with respect to the service price, pi. As the customer
type is not veri￿able a uniform price is set for both types by an individual
supplier. Increasing the price marginally results in higher pro￿ts from the
market served by this supplier but lowers the market shares putting pressure
on pro￿ts. This trade-oﬀ determines the optimal price. Solving from the
￿rst-order conditions (3) − (5) we obtain:
e e
A =




1+t − cAγA − cBγB − tcB
cB (1 + t)
e p =1+t − cAγ
A − cBγ
B
As the equilibrium is symmetric we drop the subscripts and denote the values
by e eA, e eB and e p. In what follows we, however, show that this symmetric
9equilibrium does not exist as the suppliers have an incentive to specialize
in serving only one type. We prove this for the symmetric equilibrium that
we obtain for t → 0. By continuity of the ￿rst-order conditions with respect









1 − cAγA − cBγB
cB
(7)
e p =1− cAγ
A − cBγ
B (8)
Given supplier 1 chooses e eA, e eB and e p as determined by equations (6)− (8),
is it optimal for supplier 2 to deviate and specialize in type B? Supplier 2￿s













2 − p2 ≥ e v
B − e p
Supplier 2 maximizes pro￿ts from serving only type B subject to the con-
straint that type B will select supplier 2. Supplier 2 gives just enough value
for money to type B to attract him so that the constraint is binding:
p2 = v
B
2 − e v
B + e p (9)
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Supplier 2 oﬀers ￿rst-best value of service to type B. We can solve the price







B + e p










B + e p − (1 − cB)
¶
(11)
Pro￿ts in the symmetric equilibrium are zero. From (6)−(8) we see that
the price just covers the costs: e p = cAe eA = cBe eB. Therefore if the pro￿ts
given by equation (11) are positive, it is optimal for supplier 2 to deviate and



















B − cBe e
B¢⁄
> 0 (12)
We have taken into account in (12) that e p = cBe eB as per equations (7)
and (8). Then supplier 2￿s specialization pro￿ts depend on the diﬀerence
between the surplus from the ￿rst-best eﬀort, eB∗, and the surplus from the
proposed symmetric equilibrium eﬀort e eB. By de￿nition the surplus from the
￿rst-best eﬀort is greater than from any other level of eﬀort, including e eB.
Therefore the diﬀerence and the pro￿ts from specialization are positive and
the symmetric equilibrium does not exist.
The intuition for the result runs as follows. By competing head to head
for both types of customers the suppliers would drive the pro￿ts down to zero.
When each supplier specializes in one type, they can soften the competition
and earn higher pro￿ts. This is why the symmetric equilibrium does not
exist.
We have yet to prove that the specialization equilibrium exists.4 We
proceed in two steps. In the ￿rst proposition we characterize specialization
equilibria. In the second proposition we prove their existence.
4To derive Bertrand equilibria in our setup we employ a ￿exible tie-breaking rule. That
is, to which supplier indiﬀerent customers go is determined by equilibrium requirements.

































(v) γBp2 − γAp1 = γB (1 − cB) − γA (1 − cA),
where Θ ≡ p2 − p1 =
γB






− (1 − cA)




1 ≥ 1 − cA and ph
2 ≥ 1 − cB so that
(i) For every price p1 ∈ [1 − cA,p h
1] there exists a price p2 ∈ [1 − cB,p h
2]
such that a specialization equilibrium exists as characterized by Proposition
2.
(ii)The upper limits ph
1 and ph
2 are given by
ph
1 =1− cA + ∆0 and ph
2 =1− cB +
γA
γB∆0
where ∆o = min{￿ ∆,ln( 1
cA) − (1 − cA),
γB
γA(ln( 1
cB) − (1 − cB))}
and ￿ ∆ is the minimal solution of
−ln(1 − γA(1 − eΘ)) + γA(cA − cB)+
(γA)2
1−γA∆ =0
with Θ = p2 − p1 = cA − cB −
γB−γA
γB ∆.
The proofs are given in the Appendix. Propositions 2 and 3 have the
following implications. Supplier 1 specializes in the ordinary type A and
supplier 2 in the rewarding type B. The rewarding customers receive a higher
level of service than the ordinary customers, each receiving the quality level
according to the ￿rst-best solution. Even with full specialization the suppliers
provide potential competition for each other. Eﬀort is also planned for the
type that in the end is not served. This keeps the serving supplier￿s quality
up.
Pro￿ts from specialization in type A and B have to be equal although
the service levels and costs are diﬀerent for the two types. Otherwise spe-
cialization equilibrium does not exist: the low-pro￿t supplier would capture
the market of the high-pro￿t supplier by providing the same level of service
with ε−lower price.
12An important feature of Proposition 3 is that there is indeterminacy of
equilibria. Any pair of prices such that the suppliers have equal pro￿ts,
γBp2 − γAp1 = γB (1 − cB) − γA (1 − cA), can occur in equilibrium as long
as the prices cover the suppliers￿ costs, prices are not larger than the cus-
tomer￿s valuation for the service and suppliers have no incentive to attract
all customers. The lowest prices in equilibrium are given by p1 =1−cA and
p2 =1−cB. In this case the suppliers￿ pro￿ts are zero. The highest prices in
equilibrium are such that at least one customer type is left with zero surplus
from this service.
In Proposition 3 the upper limits of the prices are not only related to the
customers￿ valuation of the service but also to ￿ ∆. ￿ ∆ is de￿ned so that any
p1 > 1 − cA + ￿ ∆ and a corresponding p2 that gives supplier 2 equal pro￿ts
cannot be sustained in specialization equilibrium because the temptation to
capture both types is too high. When prices are very high undercutting
the rival slightly and capturing both types is pro￿table and this breaks the
specialization equilibrium. But if 1−cA+ ￿ ∆ is greater than type A￿s valuation
of the service, ￿ ∆ does not play any role in equilibrium. Even at a price which
leaves no surplus to the customer there is no incentive to deviate from the
specialization equilibrium.
The intuition for the indeterminacy runs as follows. In order to attract
the customer served by the competitor that makes positive pro￿ts, a ￿rm
must oﬀer a price and service level combination that is more appealing for
the customer. However, this requires that the price for the customers that are
currently served will change too because price discrimination is not possible.
In equilibrium prices and service levels are determined such that trying to
capture both customer types will not be pro￿table.
In the following we discuss the properties of the specialization equilibrium
in more detail. Our ￿rst observation shows that indeterminacy rests on the
existence of cost and share diﬀerences. From Proposition 3 we obtain:
Corollary 1 Suppose that γA = γB and cA = cB.T h e n ph
1 =1− cA and
ph
2 =1−cB. Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium with p1 = p2 =1−cA =
1 − cB.
The preceding Corollary shows that we obtain a Bertrand type equilib-
rium if all customers are completely homogenous. From Proposition 3 we
obtain that the indeterminacy is increasing in the cost diﬀerence and that
13for large cost diﬀerences ￿ ∆ may not be binding.5
The following Corollary gives some further properties of the specialization
equilibrium.
Corollary 2 (i) Π1 = Π2 ≥ 0
(ii) Π1 = Π2 =0if and only if p1 =1− cA and p2 =1− cB
(iii) Suppose γA = γB = 1
2. Then p2 − p1 = cA − cB.
Property (i) in Corollary 2 states that the pro￿ts of the suppliers are
equal in this specialization equilibrium. The minimum value for the pro￿ts
is zero and according to property (ii) it occurs when the prices are equal to
the lowerbound given in Proposition 3, i.e. when the price just covers the
costs. For any other prices higher than the lowerbound the suppliers￿ pro￿ts
are positive.
Finally, property (iii) shows that when there are equal proportions of
the two types in the population we can solve for the price diﬀerence in equi-
librium. Supplier 2 charges a higher price than supplier 1. This is because
supplier 2 is serving the rewarding type who receives a higher level of service
than the ordinary type served by supplier 1. The price diﬀerence re￿ects the
diﬀerent production costs.
The indeterminacy raises the question about the selection of equilibria. A
standard selection criterion is Payoﬀ dominance under which strategic players
coordinate on equilibrium that yields higher payoﬀs than any other equilibria.
Applying this criterion leads to the selection of equilibrium that yields the
highest pro￿ts for the ￿rms. From the pro￿t equations in equilibrium
Π1 = γ
A (p1 − (1 − cA)) = γ
B (p2 − (1 − cB)) = Π2 (13)
we immediately conclude that Payoﬀ dominance (among ￿rms) yields the
equilibrium with the highest prices. This is examined in the following Corol-
lary where we assume that indeterminacy is suﬃciently large.
5Whether the constraint ￿ ∆ is binding or not depends also in a complicated way on the
share of type A and type B customers. Details are available upon request.
14Corollary 3 Suppose ￿ ∆ ≥ min{ln( 1
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γA ≤ γA
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The proof is given in the Appendix. Corollary 3 shows that on the knife-
edge (γA = γA) both suppliers charge a price equal to the customer￿s val-
uation of the service. But typically one customer type pays less than his
valuation. When γA > γA (resp. γA < γA) it is type A (resp. B) that re-
ceives a positive surplus from this service. When the proportion of the type
is high in the population, this type receives a surplus. This is driven by the
equal pro￿t requirement. The supplier of the majority type has to earn a
lower price-cost margin than the supplier of the minority type to make equal
pro￿ts. This constrains the price for the majority type and leaves him with
a positive surplus.
Corollary 3 also shows that the critical value γA is increasing in the cost
diﬀerence between the two types. When the cost diﬀerence increases, the gap
between the ￿rst best service levels of the two types increases. Since type
A￿s valuation is lower it becomes more likely that A￿s valuation becomes the
binding constraint for the highest prices. Then type A has to have an even
higher majority to receive positive surplus.
Notice that the critical value γA is greater than half. That is, type A has
to have a signi￿cant majority to receive surplus from the service. While even
equal proportions of the types in the population imply that type B receives
surplus. This is because type A￿s valuation is lower and it is more likely to
be the binding constraint for the prices.
We immediately observe that the equilibrium selected by the Payoﬀ dom-
inance criterion among the suppliers is welfare minimal for the consumers.
At least one type of customer pays for his service a price equal to his val-
uation and therefore receives zero surplus from this service. One type of
customer may get a positive but small surplus.













) and therefore the service levels are independent of prices.
Hence, high prices simply amount to a transfer from the customers to the
suppliers. Note that service levels vB
1 and vA
2 depend on prices but are not
demanded in equilibrium by the customers.
In the next section we examine how the outcome will diﬀer when one of
the suppliers is public. We maintain the assumption that prices under private
competition are selected according to the Payoﬀ dominance criterion.
5 Competition between public and private sup-
pliers
In this section we analyse the mixed institution with public supplier 1 and
private supplier 2. We consider directly the case t =0 . The maximization


























The public supplier￿s fee f1 is set by the regulator and ￿nanced by lump sum
taxation while the manager chooses the eﬀort levels for each type.


























The private supplier is free to choose the price for the service in addition to
the eﬀort levels.
Government pays the fees for the public supplier 1￿s customers while
the private supplier 2￿s customers pay the fees themselves. Therefore, when
choosing which supplier to go to, the customers compare the quality diﬀerence
(vi
2 − vi
1) to the private fee. The quality of the private service has to be
high enough compared to the quality of the public service to convince some
customers to opt out and pay the private fees.
We assume in the following that the fee revenues are suﬃcient to motivate
the manager to participate and thus the regulator does not need to pay an
additional ￿xed wage.6
Proposition 4 gives our main result for the mixed institution.
6The extension to the case w>0 is straightforward and omitted.
16Proposition 4 Assume 1−cB < −ln(1 − cA + cB). Suppose that the regu-






































The proof is given in the Appendix. When the regulator sets the public
fee b f1 =( 1− cA) the public supplier specializes in the ordinary type A and
the private supplier in the rewarding type B. Each type of customer receives
￿rst-best service level.
In equilibrium the private supplier oﬀers higher quality service for both
types. Type A, however, opts for the lower quality public service to avoid
paying the private fee. While for type B the quality diﬀerence is high enough
to justify paying the private fee.
Why does not the private supplier also try to capture type A customers?
Type A is comparing the value of public service, vA






. To attract type A ￿ who already receives ￿rst best
quality from the public supplier ￿ the private supplier has to oﬀer A more
value for money. The best way to do this is to lower both price and quality
(see part (v) in the proof of Proposition 4) so that the price falls more than
the quality. (This lower quality is still higher than ￿rst best.) Even with
this best deviation the private supplier would be making a loss on type A
customers. The private supplier therefore does not wish to serve the high-
cost customers but concentrates on the low-cost customers. This is related
to the concern in the health literature about the eﬀects of competition on
high-cost customers (e.g. Newhouse (1996) and Ellis (1998)). However, in
our model dumping by the private supplier does not harm type A customers
as they are served by the public supplier and receive ￿r s tb e s tq u a l i t yt h e r e .
Why does not the public supplier capture type B customers? To attract
type B customers the public supplier has to oﬀer them higher quality. But
the regulator has set the public fee so low that it does not cover the cost
of increased quality. The public supplier would make a loss on type B and
accordingly optimally specializes in type A. Note that the ￿r s tb e s tq u a l i t y
17for the high-cost type A is lower than the ￿r s tb e s tq u a l i t yf o rt y p eB .T h e
public fee is just suﬃcient to cover the cost of ￿r s tb e s tq u a l i t yf o rt y p eA .
The assumption 1−cB < −ln(1 − cA + cB) requires that the cost diﬀer-
ence is suﬃciently large. The assumption does not hold for cA = cB as the
customer types have to be suﬃciently diﬀerent in order to get separation in
equilibrium. In the remainder of the paper we assume that the assumption
1 − cB < −ln(1 − cA + cB) holds.
The fee level b f1 =( 1− cA) leaves the public supplier with zero pro￿ts
while the private supplier is able to obtain positive pro￿ts by its service and
price diﬀerentiation. This is stated in the following Corollary.
Corollary 4 The pro￿ts in equilibrium are given by
(i) b Π1 =0
(ii) b Π2 = γB [−ln(1 − cA + cB) − (1 − cB)] > 0.
Proof. Straightforward using Proposition 4.
The higher is the cost diﬀerence, (cA − cB), the higher are the private
supplier￿s pro￿ts and the price it charges for type B customers. The intuition
runs as follows. A larger cost diﬀerence makes the public supplier￿s oﬀers
to type B customers rather unattractive as it cannot charge a higher fee
level. The private supplier can exploit this by oﬀering high prices and more
attractive service levels which generates pro￿ts.
Under privatization the specialization equilibrium exists only if the pro￿ts
of the two suppliers are equal. In the mixed structure we do not have the
same requirement because the regulator sets so low fee for the public supplier
that they cannot capture type B who requires a high-value service.
6 Optimal institution
In Sections 4 and 5 we have shown that the ￿rst best service level emerges
under both privatization and the mixed institution. However, the institutions
diﬀer in the fee levels and ￿ as we will illustrate ￿ for some parameter values
the mixed institution can protect the customers from excessive prices.
Let us ￿r s te x a m i n et h ef e e sf o rt h eo r d i n a r yt y p eA . I nt h em i x e d
institution the public supplier 1 charges a fee b f1 =( 1 − cA) for type A.
18Under privatization the lowerbound for the price type A pays is (1 − cA)
whereas in the equilibrium selected by Payoﬀ dominance it is equal to A￿s





, when γA is low or somewhat lower









− (1 − cB)
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, for high γA
(provided that ￿ ∆ is suﬃciently large). Under privatization type A clearly
pays a higher fee for the same service level.
Type B is served by a private supplier in both institutions. In the mixed
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low γA. The price in the mixed institution is clearly lower than the maximal





. What requires more analysis is the case where type B
receives a positive surplus under privatization. We do that in the following
Corollary.
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(i) b f1 < p1























The proof is given in the Appendix. In the mixed structure the regulator
sets the public fee so low that it just covers the costs of serving type A.
This fee is clearly lower than the fee type A pays under privatization. The
low public fee also constrains through competition the fee level the private
supplier can charge. Therefore also the private fee paid by type B is relatively
low in the mixed institution.
Under privatization there is no anchor for the prices and the prices es-
calate to the highest possible level. The upperbound for the price is the
customers￿ valuation for the service. But the price is also constrained by
the equal pro￿t condition. It is this equal pro￿t condition that can work
powerfully when type B has a signi￿cant majority. The supplier of the mi-
nority type A has to earn a higher price-cost margin than the supplier of the
majority type B to make equal pro￿ts. Therefore supplier 2￿s price has to
19be much lower than B￿s valuation for the service. From Corollary 5 we know
that for γA < e γ
A the equal pro￿t condition constrains the price for type B
so much that it is actually lower than the relatively low price in the mixed
institution.
Corollary 5 also states that the critical value e γ
A is increasing in the cost
diﬀerence. This is because the price b p2 under mixed institution is increasing
in the price diﬀerence while the price p2 under privatization (when type B
receives a positive surplus) is decreasing in the cost diﬀerence. When the
cost diﬀerence increases (i.e. cA increases) the price-cost margin for supplier
1 serving type A is reduced. To keep the pro￿ts equal also supplier 2￿s price-
cost margin has to decrease and therefore the price type B pays becomes
lower under privatization. Since privatization becomes more favourable to
type B, the range of parameter values for which B￿s price is lower in the
mixed institution is reduced, i.e. the critical e γ
A increases.
The service levels are ￿rst best in both institutions. Therefore analyzing
the consumer welfare boils down to comparing the prices. The ordinary cus-
tomer is better oﬀ in the mixed institution. The fee is lower and furthermore
it is the government that pays the fee. In the end type A of course bears
his share of the tax burden. The cost of this service to him in the mixed
structure is γA b f1 which is de￿nitely lower than p1 under privatization.
The rewarding customer also pays a lower price in the mixed institution
for γA > e γ
A but he has the additional tax burden of γA b f1. While for low
γA type B is better oﬀ under privatization since he pays a lower price and
avoids the tax burden of the mixed institution. In general type B can be
b e t t e ro rw o r s eo ﬀ in the mixed institution.7 The following Proposition gives
the welfare eﬀects.
Proposition 5 A change from the private to the mixed institution
(i) increases welfare of type A customers,
(ii) decreases welfare of type B customers if γA ≤ e γ
A and





























7Due to complexity of calculations Proposition 5 gives only a suﬃcient condition for
type B￿s welfare eﬀect.
20When γA is large, the aggregate consumer welfare is higher in the mixed
institution. Type A￿s fee is always lower in the mixed institution and ad-
ditionally also type B pays a lower price in the mixed institution when it
is a small minority. Therefore clearly the mixed institution maximizes the
consumer surplus when γA is large.
When type B is a large majority (γA is small) the equal pro￿tr e q u i r e m e n t
determines that B pays a lower price under privatization. Although type A￿s
fee is lower in the mixed institution, their share of the population is so small
that the positive eﬀect for type B dominates and surprisingly privatization
maximizes consumer surplus for γA <γ A .
Proposition 5 also states that the critical γA is increasing in the cost
diﬀerence. The larger is the cost diﬀerence, the smaller is the parameter range
where the mixed institution maximizes consumer welfare. We know from
Corollary 5 that a higher cost diﬀerence makes privatization more favourable
for type B. This is because the price in the mixed institution increases while
the price under privatization decreases. When examining type A we ￿nd
that his price decreases in both institutions as a response to a higher cost
diﬀerence. Under privatization type A pays a price equal to his valuation
o ft h es e r v i c ew h i l ei nt h em i x e ds t r u c t u r eh i sf e ei se q u a lt ot h ec o s t so f
the service. When the cost diﬀerence increases (i.e. cA increases), the level
of service provided for type A is reduced resulting in lower value and lower
costs. Supplier 1￿s price-cost margin is reduced, which means that the price
decreases more under privatization. Accordingly, both type A and B are
relatively better oﬀ under privatization when the cost diﬀerence is higher
and γA increases.
When the regulator sets the public fee low in the mixed institution, it
also anchors the competing private supplier￿s fee relatively low. Under com-
petition there is no anchor for the prices and they escalate to the highest
level. The mixed institution therefore protects the consumers from excessive
pricing ￿ unless type B has a majority. Then the equal pro￿tr e q u i r e m e n t
constrains the price for type B so much that surprisingly privatization max-
imizes consumer welfare ￿ although a move from the mixed structure to
privatization is not a Pareto improvement for all the customers.
Finally, we note that total welfare that includes the producer and con-
sumer surplus is equal in both institutions. Customers receive the same
quality level of service and eﬀort costs are the same. Potentially high prices
under private competition are simply a redistribution from the customers to
21the ￿rms.
Excessive pricing under private competition is not only a transfer problem
but becomes a total welfare (and social) problem if there are poor or wealth
constrained customers. We take this up in the next Section.
7 Wealth constraints
In this Section we discuss the consequences of wealth constraints. Suppose
that a fraction αA of type A customers are poor. Similarly, a fraction αB of
type B customers are poor. Being poor could have two meanings. First, cus-
tomers cannot pay any positive price for the services. Second, poor customers
can pay a smaller price. As an illustration suppose that poor customers can-






if they are type B customers. Rich customers are
n o tw e a l t hc o n s t r a i n e d .W ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r eγA > e γ
A, i.e. the prices
for both types are lower in the mixed institution.
7.1 Privatization versus mixed institution
Under full privatization poor customers are not served at all if they cannot
pay a positive price. When they can pay at most the smallest possible price,
it is straightforward to see that prices under privatization will tend to be
higher and at least poor customers of type A are not served.8
The mixed institution can alleviate the customers￿ wealth constraints in
two ways. Obviously, everybody can obtain the services of the public supplier
at no cost. The second eﬀect is more subtle. By ￿xing the fee at b f1 =
(1 − cA), the price of the private supplier is also kept down. This allows
8At the price (1 − cA) for type A customers, private suppliers would make zero pro￿ts.
Although poor customers will drop out of the market when prices are raised, the pro￿ts
of private suppliers will become positive. Payoﬀ dominance implies that prices will be at
the highest possible level. Hence, poor type A customers are not served. Since (1 − cB)





it depends on the parameter values and in particular on
the share of poor type B customers whether these customers will be served or not. A












but not the higher
prices under privatization to bene￿t from the private supplier which may not
be possible when both suppliers are private.
However, the mixed institution faces problems on its own as the public
supplier may have an incentive to lower the quality of its services when
very poor customers are present. The quality problem is illustrated by the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the regulator chooses the fee level b f1 =( 1− cA)
and that there are poor type A customers who cannot pay any positive price.
Then the equilibrium of Proposition 4 does not exist anymore as the public
supplier would deviate to eA
1 = eB
1 =0 .
Proof. Suppose that the private supplier selects b eA
2 , b eB
2 and b p2. If the public
supplier chooses b eA
1 =
1−cA
cA and b eB
1 =
1−cA
cB its pro￿ts will be zero. By choosing
eA
1 = eB









as poor customers cannot switch to the private supplier. Hence the equilib-
rium of Proposition 4 does not exist anymore. Q.E.D.
In the equilibrium of the mixed institution in Section 5 the public sup-
plier makes zero pro￿ts. Now the public supplier can pro￿tf r o mt h ep o o r
customers who have no choice. The public supplier can reduce the quality of
the service to zero and earn the ￿xed fee paid for the poor customers. The
important insight of Proposition 6 is the existence of a service trap if the gov-
ernment sets the remuneration for serving customers at the level (1 − cA).
The public supplier oﬀers minimal service levels in such cases. Note that
even an arbitrarily small share of poor customers destroys the existence as
the public supplier is always better oﬀ to switch to eA
1 = eB
1 =0 . 9
T h eg o v e r n m e n tm i g h tt r yt oo v e r c o m et h es e r v i c et r a pb yr a i s i n gt h ef e e
levels. However, this is only works if the share of poor customers is small. The
problem is that higher fee levels raise not only the incentives of the supplier
to provide better services to attract rich customers, but also the gains from
9Service trap exists even when the poor customers have a choice between two public
suppliers as long as a fraction of customers are immobile (e.g. for geographical reasons)
and must go to one supplier.
23serving the poor customers with the lowest quality level. The latter eﬀect
dominates if the share of poor customer is suﬃciently high. Moreover, by
raising the fee level, the regulator triggers higher prices for type B customers
which causes poor customers of those type to switch to the public supplier
who oﬀers lower services. Finally, rich customers at the private supplier will
face higher prices.
To sum up, in contrast to full privatization the mixed institution can
accommodate wealth constraints as long as the poor customers can pay min-
imal prices or the share of very poor customers is suﬃciently small. If wealth
constraints are tight and widespread, however, the regulator faces a severe
service trap problem.
7.2 Vouchers
As discussed above wealth constraints may introduce undesirable features to
the mixed institution. In order to preserve the merits of the mixed institution,
the poor customers can be oﬀered service vouchers which enable them to
pay a certain amount of money to the service provider and thus the wealth
constraint would be eliminated. In particular, the poor students could be





in order to be able to
choose between the public and the private supplier. It is obvious that the
voucher solution dominates the mixed solution under wealth constraints in
terms of welfare as long as tax distortions are suﬃciently small.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that a mix of a public and a private supplier
can be superior to full privatization. In the mixed institution government
sets the public fee so low that it also anchors the private fee relatively low.
While under privatization the prices escalate to the highest level.
In this paper we did not analyse an institution in which both suppliers
are public. A complete public supply cannot improve on the provision of
services because the service level already reaches ￿rst best. Additional tax
distortions would occur and therefore we do not expect that refraining from
privatization is socially desirable. Moreover, in the mixed institution, the
regulator only needs to determine one fee level and can leave the remaining
pricing to the private supplier. A complete public organization of service
24delivery would require that diﬀerent public suppliers obtain diﬀerent fee levels
in order to achieve service diﬀerentiation comparable to that under the mixed
institution. This would increase the complexity of the regulatory task.
We have assumed that the values and the costs of diﬀerent types are
separable. In reality there are externalities between students learning from
each other (and perhaps being disturbed by other students). Teacher￿s eﬀort
costs for diﬀerent types of students are also not independent as the teacher
is allocating a limited time between diﬀerent tasks. Relaxing separability
assumptions remains as an open question.
25Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose supplier 1 specializes in type A customers and supplier 2 in type
Bc u s t o m e r s .
(i) In equilibrium it must hold that
v
A
1 − p1 = v
A
2 − p2 = d
v
B
1 − p1 = v
B
2 − p2 = f
Otherwise suppose vA
1 −p1 >v A
2 −p2. Then supplier 1 could raise pro￿ts
by raising p1.


















− p1 = d



























(iii) The suppliers￿ pro￿ts must be equal in equilibrium. Suppose Π1 <
Π2. Then if supplier 1 sets eB
1 = eB
2 , p1 = p2 − ε and eA
1 =0it will capture
all type B customers and make a higher pro￿t (arbitrarily close to Π2).
Π1 = γ
A [p1 − (1 − cA)] = Π2 = γ
B [p2 − (1 − cB)]
From the equal pro￿t condition we can solve for p1.
26p1 =
γB [p2 − (1 − cB)] + γA (1 − cA)
γA
Note that we can only solve for p1 as a function of p2.









































Notice that Θ = p2 − p1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Naturally the price has a lowerbound and an upperbound as the price
has to cover the costs (p1 ≥ 1 − cA and p2 ≥ 1 − cB) and the price cannot











). We next explore the other bounds on equilibrium prices.
Suppose in the specialization equilibrium supplier 1 is charging p1 =





− (1 − cA). From equal pro￿tc o n d i t i o n
p2 =1−cB +
γA




















1 − p1 ≥ v
B
2 − p2






































































































































cB (γB + γAeΘ)
(19)
























28We can solve for eA



























































1 − γA (1 − eΘ)
¶
+ γ




It is instructive to consider the case ∆ =0￿rst. Note that in the lowest

































−eΘ +1− γA ¡
1 − eΘ¢








1 − γA (1 − eΘ)
‚
< 0 (24)
29Equation (24) is negative since eΘ > 1 for Θ > 0. The deviation from the
specialization equilibrium would give supplier 2 negative pro￿ts. Therefore
specialization is an equilibrium.
We next look at the case ∆ > 0. The pro￿ts in the specialization equi-




1 − γA (1 − eΘ)
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+ γ
















We have shown that this holds for ∆ =0 . We know that ∂Θ
∂∆ > 0 if type A is
majority and therefore the ￿rst term is decreasing in ∆ while the last term is
increasing in ∆. When B is majority both terms are increasing in ∆.L e t￿ ∆




we allow that the solution may become in￿nite when type A is a majority.
When we repeat the above analysis for supplier 2 we ￿nd it is obvious that
supplier 2 charges the same deviation price and chooses the same deviation
eﬀorts as supplier 1. Therefore also the deviation pro￿ts are equal. Since
the pro￿ts in the specialization equilibrium are equal, neither supplier has an
incentive to deviate and therefore specialization equilibrium exists. Q.E.D
Proof of Corollary 3
(i) Suppose ￿ ∆ ≥ min{ln( 1





cB) − (1 − cB)
¢
}. Then we
know that the upper limits ph
1 and ph
2 are bounded only by the customers￿
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= Π2 (25)



























30If γA = γA, the suppliers￿s pro￿ts are equal at the maximal prices and











If γA > γA, then the right-hand-side of equation (25) is smaller than the
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If γA < γA, then the right-hand-side of equation (25) is greater than the
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− (1 − cB)
·2 > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4









































31In equilibrium the public supplier￿s pro￿ts are zero since b f1 =1−cA = cAb eA
1
and b f1 = cBb eB
1 .



















In equilibrium private supplier￿s pro￿ts are given by






1 − cA + cB
¶
− (1 − cB)
¶
(27)
which is positive by assumption.
(ii) We ￿rst show that all type A customers go to the public supplier
and all type B customers go to the private supplier given the service levels
oﬀered in equilibrium. Assuming an eﬀort level that is larger than b eA
1 by an










2 −b p2 =l n
￿
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1 − cA + cB
cB
¶
and therefore b sA
1 =1 , b sA
2 =0 , b sB
1 =0and b sB
2 =1 .
(iii) We next show that the public supplier cannot improve its pro￿ts
given the eﬀorts and the price chosen by the private supplier.
Raising eA
1 is not pro￿table since b sA
1 =1and the public supplier already
receives all type A customers. Lowering eA
1 is not optimal either because
b vA
1 = b vA
2 − b p2 and therefore supplier 1 would lose all the customers.
Because b f1 = cBb eB
1 , raising eB
1 to attract B type customers would generate
negative pro￿ts. Decreasing eB
1 is not worthwhile either because b sB
1 is already
zero. Note that b vB
1 = b vB
2 − b p2.
(iv) Given the service level oﬀered by the public supplier, we derive the
best response of the private supplier in terms of eﬀorts and price if he wants
to attract only customers of type B.
32Accordingly quality levels and price must ful￿ll
v
B
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1 − cA + cB
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Next we have to check b eA
2 . Decreasing eA
2 would not aﬀect pro￿ts as b sA
2 =0 .
Increasing eA
2 by a small margin would generate sA















which is negative since ln(x) <x−1 for any x 6=1 . (Remember that cA < 1.)
(v) Given the service level oﬀered by the public supplier, we derive the
best response of the private supplier if he wants to attract customers of both
types.
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cA (1 − cA + cB)−γ
BcB
(34)






BcA (1 − cA + cB)=0 (35)





cA (1 − γBcA + γBcB)
(36)











1 − cA + cB
cB (1 − γBcA + γBcB)
(38)





















1 − γBcA + γBcB
¶
−
1 − cA + cB
1 − γBcA + γBcB
+ cB
¶
(vi) Finally, we prove that attracting both types of customers is less pro￿table
for the private supplier than serving only type B customers.
The pro￿ts from type A when attracting both types (the ￿rst term in
(39)) are negative because ln(x)+1<xfor any x 6=1 . Furthermore, pro￿ts
from type B (the second term in (39)) are lower than the private supplier￿s
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−
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1 − cA + cB
¶
− (1 − cB)
¶
= b Π2








where y =1− cA + cB and x =1− γBcA + γBcB. Again the property holds
as long as y 6= x. Therefore it is indeed optimal for supplier 2 to specialize
in type B. Q.E.D.





for γA ≤ γA and
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for γA > γA.
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− (1 − cB)
= e γ
A
By the assumption in Proposition 4 e γ
A > 0. Furthermore, it is straightfor-
ward to show that e γ
A < γA.10 Putting these together we have found three
cases:











if γA ≥ γA.
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if and only if e γ
A <γ A < γA.
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if and only if γA < e γ
A.
Therefore b p2 < p2 if and only if γA > e γ
A.
The comparative statics with respect to the cost diﬀerence δ = cA−cB is







































10This follows from b
a+b > b0
a+b0 for a,b > 0 and b>b 0.
36Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Obvious from Corollary 4 and taking into account that type A only
pays γA b f1 in the mixed institution.
(ii) For γA ≤ e γ
A type B pays a lower price under privatization and further
avoids the tax burden of the mixed institution.
(iii) Aggregate consumer welfare is clearly higher in the mixed institution
if γA > e γ
A since both prices are lower.
For γA < e γ
A type B pays a lower price under privatization and there is a

















− (1 − cA)
‚
Therefore the aggregate consumer welfare is higher in the mixed institu-
tion for the case γA < e γ
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i = γ
A
It is easy to see that γA < e γ
A. Therefore the aggregate consumer welfare is
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37For comparative statics with respect to the cost diﬀerence we substitute in
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